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Climate Justice and the China Fallacy 
Daniel A. Farber* 
The United States, the wealthiest country in the world, contributes far 
more than its share of greenhouse gases.  It is now clear that these 
emissions have caused serious risks to the world as a whole, particularly the 
poorest nations.  Does the United States have a moral duty to impose 
reasonable curbs on its future emissions?  Does it have a duty to help other 
countries, especially poorer countries, adapt to whatever climate change 
cannot be avoided? Or, on the contrary, are any duties that we might have 
conditional on whether other countries – in particular China – take action? 
The idea that our actions are irrelevant unless China acts has 
considerable popular traction.  It has also received support from some major 
legal scholars.  Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein have recently argued that the 
United States does not have any moral duty to the rest of the world to 
reduce emissions or compensate climate change victims, in part because of 
this “China argument.”1  Posner and Sunstein argue that: 
[I]t is far from clear that the United States could have taken unilateral
action that would have created benefits for the rest of the world greater
than the cost to the United States. Unilateral reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions would have little effect on overall climate change – not
so far from zero even if aggressive and effective, and zero or very close
to it if industry simply migrated to foreign countries. The Kyoto
Protocol imposed no obligations on China, now the biggest emitter,
* Sho Sato Professor of Law and Director, California Center for
Environmental Law and Policy, University of California, Berkeley.  Some of the 
arguments made in this article are presented in more complete form as part of a 
forthcoming article, The Case for Climate Compensation [UTAH L. REV. 2008]. 
1. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice 96 GEO. L.J. 1565 (2008).
A previous version with even more forthright language on this point appeared as U. CHI. L. 
& ECON., Olin Working Paper No. 354, 2007, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008958. 
For similar views, see Maurice O’Brien, Cutting Carbon Emissions Futile, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, 
Apr. 09, 2008, available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/466/story.cfm?cid= 
466&objected=10502373&ref=rss; William L. Thomas, The Kyoto Protocol: History, Facts, 
Figures and Projections, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Apr. 15, 1999, available at http://www.pur. 
com/pubs/3213.cfm (“American concessions on binding reductions will be completely 
ineffectual if new Asian, African and Latin American emissions overwhelm U.S. savings”).  
 West  Northwest, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 2009 
16 
and placed heavy burdens on the United States. In this light, the claim 
that American policy has been negligent, under prevailing legal 
standards, is far-fetched.2 
In another recent paper, Jason Johnston argues that whether 
investments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions “pay off in terms of a 
lessened probability of harmful climate change” will “depend almost entirely 
upon the actions taken by other countries, in particular by China.”3  He does 
favor some adaptation assistance to developing countries, but accuses 
those who favor U.S. emission reductions of “climate hysteria.” 
The “China argument” – that we only have a duty to reduce emissions 
or assist victims of climate change if China reduces emissions – is all too 
often taken for granted.  It may be superficially appealing, but is based on 
two serious errors.  One error is conceptual: The idea that one person’s 
culpability is excused to the extent that the actions of others would have 
independently caused the same harm.  That view is contrary to a basic and 
deeply entrenched principle of our tort system.  The other error is factual: 
The assumption that the amount of harm done by our own emissions 
diminishes to the extent that other countries have high emissions.   
At the core of the “China argument” is that someone whose conduct 
would have caused harm by itself should be released from responsibility if 
another party’s conduct would have independently caused the harm. 
Similar arguments have been made many times, in many different settings, 
by tort defendants.  They have never gained any traction: 
The rule that has evolved is that, at least where both causes involve 
comparable blameworthiness, both actors are liable, even though the 
conduct of either one was not a sine qua non of the injury because of 
the conduct of the other.  There is no reason why a polluter should be 
insulated from responsibility in a case where a traditional tortfeasor 
would not be.4 
As the Ninth Circuit explained: 
Take the philosophers’ example . . . of the kitchen with a light switch at 
each end.  When two people simultaneously flip both switches on, the 
light goes on.  Neither person’s conduct is a sine qua non, because the 
2. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at  1600.
3. Jason Scott Johnston, Climate Change Hysteria and the Supreme Court: The
Economic Impact of Global Warming on the U.S. and the Misguided Regulation of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, available at http://ssrn.com.abstract=1098476. 
4. Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 207 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2000).
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light would have gone on anyway.  Neither individual’s conduct made a 
difference to the outcome.  [This] analysis would compel the 
conclusion that neither person caused the light to go on. 
. . . If conduct had to be a sine qua non even for this overdetermined 
result, then neither person’s conduct caused the light to go on.  But the 
light went on.  And it did so by human agency, not spontaneously.  So 
the conclusion that [defendant’s] argument compels, that no one caused 
the light to go on, is false.  Because the correct answer has to be the 
same for the two individuals, by eliminating the false answer we have 
left only one possible answer which must be true: Each of the two 
persons caused the light to go on.5 
The classic example of this over-determination effect is the destruction 
of property by two simultaneous negligent fires.  The courts consistently 
hold that both are liable, dismissing arguments that neither one should be 
considered culpable because the property would have been destroyed by the 
other fire anyway.6  For the same reason, when a group of emitters 
contributes to saturating the atmosphere with a gas, all of them should be 
considered causal factors, even if the marginal contribution to the harmful 
effect is zero because of the saturation effect. 
Of course, we are not necessarily talking about legal liability in the 
climate change setting.  But the tort rule about simultaneous tortfeasors 
seems to reflect a clear moral judgment and reflects an obvious moral 
principle: no one is excused from responsibility just because someone else 
was also responsible – “Johnny did it too” is an argument that is only 
suitable for children. 
Thus, even if a saturation effect did exist, it would not excuse the 
United States from reducing emissions or relieve it of responsibility for past 
emissions.  More importantly, there is no reason to believe in the existence 
of such a saturation effect.  Climate models show increased temperature 
5. Id. at 1184-85.
6. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW (3d ed. 2007)
(stating that this is the “universal” outcome and that it would be “absurd” to relieve 
either negligent party of liability). This position is also taken by the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27 (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, April 6, 
2005) (“[i]f multiple acts exist, each of which alone would have been a factual cause 
under § 26 of the physical harm at the same time, each act is regarded as a factual 
cause of the harm.”)  Courts have consistently applied this role in toxic tort cases 
where the plaintiff has been exposed to the same toxic substance by multiple 
defendants.  None of the defendants is allowed to escape liability on the grounds 
that the other exposures would have been enough to cause liability. Id. cmt. g at 470. 
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effects with increased CO2 emissions over a broad range of assumptions.
7  
Nor is there any reason to think that once temperature increases reach a 
certain level, further increases will not cause additional harm.  Economists 
generally model damages as a quadratic function of temperature increase 
past a certain point.8  The Nordhaus model, which seems to be particularly 
well regarded by American economists, “predicts that the cost of climate 
change will increase faster than global mean temperature, so that the 
aggregate loss in global GDP almost doubles as global mean temperature 
increases from 4°C to 6°C above pre-industrial levels.”9  
Indeed, in terms of the level of the carbon tax, the saturation argument 
may be exactly backwards.  If there is a nonlinear effect and if temperature 
increases are proportional to increases in carbon dioxide concentrations, 
then the optimal carbon tax (in terms of global welfare) for the United States 
may be higher if China fails to control emissions than if China does so. 
Under other assumptions, the optimal tax may be lower if China fails to 
control emissions.  But in any event, there is no reason to think the optimal 
tax would be zero.  Thus, regardless of whether other countries do so, 
countries that choose to reduce their CO2 emissions help reduce the 
ultimate level of harm (or risk of harm) from climate change.  In fact, 
perhaps counter-intuitively, failure to control emissions by one country may 
become even more harmful if other countries are also failing to do so.  This 
is the opposite of the saturation effect.10 
7. The IPCC synthesis of the physical science for policymakers (Table SPM.6)
shows that differences in CO2 concentrations at the point where concentrations are 
stabilized from 350 ppm to 700 ppm translates into temperature changes from 
around 2.0°C to the neighborhood of 5°C.  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (2007), 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf.  There 
is no sign of any saturation effect in the sense that marginal increases in 
concentration result in declining contributions to temperature. 
8. See Robert Mendelsohn et al., Country Specific Market Impacts of Climate Change:
Uncertainties and Economic Methods for Assessing Climate Impacts, 45 CLIMATIC CHANGE 533 
(2000).  For a discussion of the various models, see N. H. STERN. THE ECONOMICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 146, FIG. 6.2 (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
9. See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC 
MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING 94-95 (2000).  
10. There could still be an equity argument that the U.S. should not have to
bear the cost of controlling emissions if other countries fail to do so.  I am not 
persuaded that it is inequitable to ask one wrongdoer to cease and desist, when 
doing so will avoid some harm, even if other wrongdoers are beyond persuasion. 
Even if the road is full of drunk drivers on New Years Eve, adding another drunk 
driver merely increases the risk level to other drivers. 
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In part, the “China argument” may be based on confusion between the 
total level of harm and the marginal level of harm.  It is true that if other 
nations such as China do not reduce emissions, the total level of harm would 
be much higher than if everyone controlled emissions.  But this does not 
mean that the marginal global harm from the incremental contribution of the 
United States suddenly becomes zero, or even that it would be decreased.  If 
the incremental net harm from U.S. emissions is above zero, the optimal 
carbon tax should also be set at this level.11  The incremental harm from U.S. 
emissions could be driven to zero only if there is a saturation effect, so that 
climate change “maxes out” from the contribution of other countries and 
emissions from the U.S. become irrelevant.  From an economic perspective, 
if the marginal harm is above zero, the United States should decrease its 
emissions, and if it fails to do so, it should be held responsible for the 
resulting harm. 
Thus, the “China argument” does not offer a valid excuse for the United 
States.  Even if China fails to control its emissions – in which case we are all 
admittedly in a lot of trouble – the U.S. remains responsible for its own past 
and future emissions, and for the incremental harm that it causes.  Of 
course, we don’t know what China might do in the future about its 
emissions. So it seems especially strained to say that we have no duty to do 
anything today because of the mere possibility that China may not do its 
share to help reduce emissions in the future. 
In the context of adaptation, the “China argument” is at its weakest. 
Let us assume for the sake of argument that at some point in the future, 
America’s efforts to reduce emissions will make no different to climate 
change, and let’s suppose that this possibility does excuse us from making 
the effort to reduce emissions today.  Even so, our past emissions have 
already contributed to ongoing climate change, which will require 
adaptation by developing countries even before our historic contributions to 
current greenhouse gas levels could be matched by China.  At least for that 
interim period, we would surely have a duty to help finance adaptation in 
developing countries.  As I have argued, our duty to finance adaptation is 
even stronger because China’s potential responsibility for climate change, 
however great, would not erase our own responsibility, and because in fact 
our emissions will continue to be harmful (and perhaps become even more 
harmful) even if China’s emissions are unchecked. 
In short, the China argument should be rejected as a fallacy in 
considering American climate policy, and in particular should be seen as 
completely irrelevant to whether we have a duty to finance adaptation by 
developing countries. It goes without saying that China’s future emissions 
11. It is important to use the net harm because climate change may also cause
some benefits, which need to be netted out. 
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are critically important to the U.S. and to the world – but our own conduct 
remains our own responsibility. 
